P-51 Mustang

Merlin-powered Mustangs were used against Japan in 1944 by the 23rd, 51st, and 311th Groups in China, while the Fifth Air Force received P-51Ds in 1945 for the 3rd Commando, 35th and 348th Groups. Perhaps the most significant Mustang missions in the Pacific were those flown from Iwo Jima by the 15th, 21st, and 506th Groups to support B-29 attacks on Japan.

When fitted with two cameras behind the cockpit the Mustang made an excellent tactical reconnaissance supplement to Lockheed’s F-5s, as the 68th Observation Group’s F-6As had shown in 1942 for the Twelfth Air Force, and the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Group of the Ninth Air Force demonstrated during the battles for France in 1944. Merlin-powered F-6Cs, F-6Ds, and F-6Ks added high-altitude performance. These aircraft all still carried their wing guns, and often used them; in fact, the last German fighter destroyed in the war was an Fw 190 downed by an F-6C on May 8, 1945.

An Evaluation
Now that the major fighter types with which the Army Air Forces fought the war have been described, it may be helpful to summarize their role. Table 7 shows what fighters were used by the AAF in the European Theater of Operations from 1942 to 1945. The planes are given in order of number of sorties, as an indication of each type’s relative importance, including Spitfires and Beaufighters obtained on reverse lend-lease, and P-6l night fighters. Unfortunately, we do not have this data for the Pacific theaters.

The first two columns give the number of sorties and show the decisive role in Europe of the Thunderbolt, Mustang, and Lightning. The next column indicates the extent that fighters were used for tactical bombing, and shows that the P-47 delivered over two-thirds of the bombs dropped by fighters.

Columns four and seven list total losses of each type on combat missions and the percentage of aircraft loss per sortie. The reader should remember this loss-rate reflects not only the type’s vulnerability to enemy aircraft, but also the relative risk of anti-aircraft fire on its particular missions. With this in mind, Lightnings seem to have suffered the heaviest losses, 1.4 percent, and Airacobras the lowest, with only 0.4 per cent per sortie. The low losses of the night fighters and fighter bombers probably indicate that attacking enemy bombers or ground targets is less risky than tackling enemy fighters.

Table 7 AAF Fighters in the European War, 1942–1945
Type P-47 P-51 P-38 P-40 P-39 Spitfire A-36 Beauf/er P-61 Total	No. of Sorties 423,435 213,873 129,849 67,059 30,547 28,981 23,373 6,706 3,637 927,460	Bomb Tonnage 113,963 5,668 20,139 11,014 121 212 8,014 ——— 141 159,272	U. S. a/c Lost in Combat 3,077 2,520 1,758 553 107 191 177 63 25 8,471	Enemy a/c Claimed Destroyed in Air 3,082 4,950 1,771 481 14 256 84 24 58 10,720	Enemy a/c Claimed Destroyed on Ground 3,202 4,131 749 40 18 3 17 0.9% 0.7% 0.9%	Combat Missions Loss Rate Per Sortie 0.7% 1.2% 1.4% 0.8% 0.4% 0.7% 0.8% —— —— 8,160

Column five indicates how many enemy aircraft were believed destroyed in the air by each type, while the sixth column tells the number of enemy aircraft destroyed when caught on the ground. This data gives only a rough index of each fighter design’s relative efficiency in the job of destroying enemy aircraft, which is its raison d’etre. The effect of ground-fire and the uneven risks of interception and offensive missions, of course, limits this index’s value.

Nevertheless, the Mustang accounted for almost half the enemy aircraft destroyed in Europe by U.S. fighters and emerges clearly as the most effective type, especially when we remember that Mustangs did relatively little bombing, and almost no interception, but were used for long-distance penetration of enemy fighter territory. Column six indicates Mustang success at strafing planes on their home fields, this largely in the war’s last weeks.

The reader may draw his own conclusions from these figures. Why did Lightnings suffer losses greater than Airacobras when the former had a much better record in destroying the enemy? Possibly because the P-39’s low-level maneuverability and extensive armor reduced the effects of hostile fire, while the P-38’s speed and ceiling enabled it to close with an enemy that wished to avoid combat more often than to join it; but no doubt the where and when of each type’s mission was more important here.

It would be highly interesting to have comparable data for the fighter types of other countries, but until then what we do have is a record of Air Force success in building fighters. The relative quality of fighter pilots is not constant, so it may not really be possible to make precise comparison of each type’s efficiency, but quality of aircraft remains a significant factor, if not always the decisive one.

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